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Abstract—This study aims to uncover the effects of
network effects, namely the social influence and network
externalities, on purchasing of digital goods. We are
particularly interested in the differences in network
effects in long tail versus the head of the market. We
used a novel dataset from an online game distribution
platform covering 1975 games and 8000 users in this
study. The results reveal that network effects are more
pronounced for the tail of the market in comparison
to the head of the market. For the games that are in
the head of the market the popularity may be more
significantly influenced by factors unobserved in this
study (such as advertising budget) yet the games in the
tail benefited greatly from any change to the network
effects. The exception was social games. The games that
relied on user to user engagement did not fare well in the
tail of the market. This study contributes to the literature
on network effects and long tail market literature by
highlighting the differential effects in different segments
of the market.
Keywords-Online Games; Network Externalities; So-
cial Influence; Digital Economy;
I. INTRODUCTION
... the emerging digital entertainment economy is going
to be radically different from today’s mass market. If
the twentieth-century entertainment industry was about
hits, the twenty-first will be equally about niches.
Chris Anderson [1]
Software markets are moving towards highly
heterogeneous consumer oriented contexts. As a
result, users today have greater freedom in choos-
ing software. There have long been calls in the IS
community to switch from the traditional manda-
tory IS settings to more voluntary use contexts [2].
With the shift in the software markets, this need
is more salient than ever. Especially in consumer-
oriented software markets, the decision making
responsibility has shifted to the consumers. In
these new market settings, characterized by the
plethora of choices catering to the wide array
of heterogeneous user preferences, choice and
subsequent purchasing behavior becomes highly
salient.
Prior work has illustrated that freedom of choice
has a significant effect on user decision making
[3]. While there is a significant body of work
on consumer choice in related disciplines, the IS
research has only recently begun addressing how
consumers make software choices in the presence
of alternatives [3]–[5]. Due to unique character-
istics of software product –such as, software li-
censes and susceptibility to network effects– there
are opportunities for theory building and testing
new boundaries for existing theories. Software
products are more susceptible to social influence
than most traditional products and goods [6]. With
this as a starting point, we aim to better understand
the role of social influence and network external-
ities in software purchasing decision setting.
A software product is defined by the context
created by the software itself [7]. Network and
brand effects are two dimensions of this self cre-
ated context. The software is affected by network
of users surrounding it and its own brand percep-
tions. Network effects can be considered in two
broad categories: Influence of a user’s immediate
network is called social influence [8]–[10], and ef-





fect of the overall network on users’ enjoyment is
called network externalities [11], [12]. Developers
can alter the design of their software to increase
the effect of network effects through features that
enable user to user interactions [13]–[15]. Here
we specifically focus on the moderating role of
social features on network effects. Our aim is
to answer the following research questions: (1)
to what extent do network effects influence pur-
chasing propensity of consumers? (2) Do social
features moderate network effects? (3) Are these
effects uniform across the market? In answering
these questions we take into account the nature of
the market and the products by controlling for the
brand loyalty and long tail effects.
The digital games are especially suited to study
end-user purchasing behavior. Games form a siz-
able portion of digital market places as enter-
tainment products are one of the most demanded
product categories [16]. Another advantage of
game market is that the consumer decision making
is mainly driven by personal choice and external
factors such as business requirements do not in-
fluence the choice, hence games provide a clear
look at motivations behind purchasing decisions.
To obtain the data used in this study, we de-
veloped and deployed a set of Python scripts on
amazon web services cloud. We choose a leading
online games distribution platform, Steam, for data
collection. Steam currently controls 70% of the
digital gaming distribution market, and has over
125 million active users [17], [18]. The data was
analyzed with conditional logit model. Our most
significant finding is revealing differences in the
effectiveness of network effects in the head and
tail of the long tail market. We found that the
products in the head of the market relied on
external factors rather than network externalities or
social influence. Still, effect of network external-
ities were enhanced products with social features
in this segment. Conversely, the products in the
tail with social features saw a dampening of the
effect of their social features. No such interaction
was observed for social influence. Meaning social
features act upon network externalities and not on
social influence.
This study contributes to the IS literature in a
few significant ways; (1) We study the purchasing
behavior with secondary data from one of the
largest online software markets, (2) We investi-
gate the relation between components of network
effects, namely the social influence and network
externalities, and social features. (3) In this study
we reveal differences in segments of the long
tail market with regards to the effect of network
externalities and social influence.
The paper is structured as follows: We present
a review of relevant literature in Section II. The
methods used in data collection and analysis are
discussed in Section III. Next, the results are
presented. Finally the paper is concluded with a
discussion of results in Section VI.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The social judgment theory, the idea of influ-
encing judgments through social processes later
gave rise to the literature on social influence [8],
[9]. The basic premise of social influence is, that
people we are close with influence our decisions.
IS literature has investigated social influence in
both acceptance research [19], [20] and in social
network studies [10].
While psychology literature focused on social
influence, economics literature has developed a
related but distinct concept, network externalities.
Instead of looking at effects of social structure,
the economics literature took on a more utilitarian
approach and investigated marginal impact of an
additional user on utility of all others [21]. Net-
work effects can operate through social influence
of close peers or through network externalities. IS
literature has identified certain features, such as
compatibility of file formats and user interfaces,
as able to alter the effects of network effects [12],
[13], [22]. There is paucity of evidence as to how
software design influences the effects of network
effects. Evidence is mostly from analytical studies
and empirical evidence is sparse [15], [22], [23].
Software as a product is highly susceptible to
network externalities [12]. In case of network
externalities, the utility of each user is a function
of the user base of the product [15]. Let us assume
Page 3608
that in absence of externalities, the utility of each
product is U = V − C. Where V is the intrinsic
benefit obtained from the product, and C is the
cost of acquiring product. The network externality
is such that, the more users use the product, the
greater the benefit. Hence, in presence of external-
ities the utility would be: U = V (γθ)−C, where
γ is the intensity of network externalities, and θ
is the user base of the product.IS literature has a
long history of using certain features –such as file
format compatibility, UI similarity, collaborative
editing, multiplayer– as proxy to estimate network
effects [12], [13]. While these features serve as
useful if not perfect proxies for network effects,
in reality they enable and enhance network effects
through social interactions and utility spillovers
of network externalities [22]. The intensity of the
network externalities can be engineered through
careful design [22]. The social features that fa-
cilitate user interactions will increase γ, hence
increasing overall utility derived from the user
base θ.
Unlike network externality effects, social influ-
ence works through direct links between users
[24]. So unlike the size of the user base, the
structure of the network comes into play for social
influence. The immediate network of others a user
is connected to, gives the user a chance to learn
from others’ behavior [10], [25]. Products that
have features that facilitate interactions between
users will increase the chances to observe others.
Hence, social features can enhance the effect of
social influence.
It is crucial to note the long tail phenomenon
in any analysis of digital market places [14], [26],
[27]. While a few major hits still account for
majority of sales, the niche products also find an
audience in these digital markets. The literature
argues this is due to unlimited shelf space on
the supply side and reduced search costs on the
demand side [28]. Still the market dynamics are
quite different between the tail and the head.
While the head enjoys high sales, the only jus-
tification for existence of the tail is reduced costs
of carrying these items [26]. This increase in
variety allows users with unusual tastes to easily
access niche content in long tail markets. Em-
pirical evaluation of the phenomenon focused on
validating the existence of long tail phenomenon.
[14] in an investigation of online and catalog sales
of women’s clothing found that online channels
exhibited less concentration of sales in the top
half of the market. Similar results have also been
reported for information goods in the context of
movie rentals [29]. While long tail markets allow
niche products to survive in the tail, the niche
products still constitute a much smaller fraction
of total sales [14], [29]. Given the differences in
network size and structure between the super stars
in the head and niche products in the tail, the
question of network effects in long tail market
merits further inquiry.
Brand loyalty is another factor that IS literature
is just beginning to investigate. We control for
brand effects in this study to prevent biases. Brand
loyalty manifests itself when consumers exhibit
a bias towards one or more alternative brands in
their purchases [30]. IS research on brand loyalty
traditionally focused on the effect of information
systems -such as online forums or social media- on
brand loyalty and not on effect of brand loyalty on
information goods purchases [31], [32]. Switching
costs, that are familiar to IS researchers, have been
identified as a mechanism used to ensure loyalty,
but loyalty is a broader concept [33]. Obviously,
the branding of an information good which pro-
vides an experience to the user, will be different
from more traditional goods such as tooth paste or
cars. The consumption of information goods are
most often not repeat purchases of same product
[34], but purchase of an improved version down
the line. Given the unique nature of information
goods, it is crucial to control for this important
factor.
III. DATA AND METHODS
A. Data
The data used in this study comes from Steam,
which according to Forbes controls 70% of the
market for downloadable PC games [18], with
over 125 Million active users [17]. To collect this
data we developed and deployed python scripts
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to scrape public profile pages of 300 randomly
selected users and their friends. Figure 1 provides
an example of said profile pages. The data we
scraped from these profile pages were entirely
populated by the Steam and not the user, increas-
ing reliability. In selecting the active users the
criteria used was: (1) that they logged in to the
steam in the last two months, and (2) had at least
one friend. This resulted in tracking a network of
8000 users with 1975 distinct games. We not only
obtained data on the friendship network but also
the ownership of the games by these users. We
used this data to obtain the ownership information
used as the dependent variable and the friendship
information used in social influence estimation.
The average user owned about 39 games.
We obtained the market share of these games
via a separate script. This script randomly sam-
pled 200,000 users and obtained a list of games
they owned. Due to private profiles and deacti-
vated accounts, we were able to obtain data from
around 165,000 users. In estimating the proportion
of users in a given population, the statistical power
is calculated as n = ( z(α/2)
E
)2(p(1 − p)). Where,
E is the error margin, z is the Z score for given
alpha level, and finally p is the proportion of the
real sample (p=0.5 gives the most conservative es-
timate). The sample size chosen gives us sufficient
power to estimate each games’ market share with
a margin of error less than 0.0031 at alpha level
0.01. We used data from this script to estimate the
user base used as proxy for network externality
effects.
The final bit of information came from a third
script used to crawl the Steam Store pages of
the 1975 games identified in the first step. In-
formation on specific games such as name, de-
veloper, features (multiplayer, single player, etc.)
was obtained. We used this information to generate
variables for social features (multiplayer games)
and the brand variables.
Given the procedure above, you can see the list
of variables used in this study with their brief
descriptions in Table I
Table II shows the descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the study. As can be seen, most
games have less than 1 percent market share. The
different sample sizes reported are due to nature
of the variables. Some variables are at user-game
pairing level and others are at game level, hence
the difference.
B. Analysis Method
Considering the binary nature of our dependent
variable (ownership) and repeated observations
of same individual, we used a conditional logit
model. The conditional logit model takes into ac-
count the common variance due to multiple obser-
vations of the same user [36]. The conditional logit
is a logit model where utility of each purchase is
specified as nij = zj′γ. zj represents a vector of
characteristics of the game j. Then the purchase






Due to network size and structure differences
between products in the head and the tail of the
long tail market, there is reason to believe differ-
ences between head and tail of the long tail market
[14]. Hence we conducted a split sample analysis
for games at the head, games at the tail and games
in between. Investigating the distribution of user
base figures, we split the sample by their user base
numbers. Top 5% was categorized as the games
in the head, 20% as the games in between, and
remaining 75% as the games in the tail.
Large sample analyses are usually easier to
achieve statistical significance. Therefore, based
on the suggestions from the recent IS literature
[37], we also assess the economic significance of
the key determinants using their estimated effect
sizes. We see a trend in the effects of our variables
of interest. The effects of all variables of interest
were lower for the products in the head, and
increased in the tail. Each unit change in number
of friends owning the game created a 2% change in
purchase odds in the head, 8% in the middle, and
15% change in the tail of the market. The results
were even more dramatic for network externalities,
while user base had no main effect in the head, in
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Figure 1. A steam profile page
Variables Description
Ownedij Binary variable describing ownership of game j for user i.
FriendsOwnij Number of friends owning the same game j with the user i.
DevOwnij Number of games from the same developer as game j owned by user i minus 1.
Socialj Binary variable describing existence of multiplayer features in game j.
Basej Market share percentage of the game j, a proxy for network externalities.
freej Binary variable for game, 0 if paid, 1 if free.
Table I
VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY.
the middle of the market each point increase in
the user base meant 40% increase in odds, and
in the tail each point increase in user base lead
to over 300 times increase in odds. These results
should be considered in the light of the nature of
user base. The user base variable ranges between 0
and 15, with the mean at 0.089. A 1 point increase
in user base basically makes any game a super star
(from 0 to head of the market). Hence the apparent
extremity of these results are normal.
Table III reveals a similar pattern in brand loy-
alty as well. Overall, we found that when individ-
uals owned another game from the same developer
they were 6% more likely to also own the focal
game. We ran robustness checks with alternative
measures of brand loyalty and observed similar
effect sizes for IP and Series loyalty as well.
We can attribute the trend of increasing effects
towards the tail to the demand for these games
being driven more by external factors such as
advertising. Hence the purchasing propensity for
the games in the head are not as heavily influenced
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Variable n Min q1 x̃ x̄ q3 Max s
Owned 590934 0 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 1.000 0.138
FriendsOwn 590934 0 0.000 0.000 0.640 0.000 245.000 2.992
Social 590934 0 0.000 0.000 0.376 1.000 1.000 0.484
DevOwn 590934 0 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 26.000 0.652
Base 590934 0 0.037 0.089 0.251 0.222 14.934 0.650
free 590934 0 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.000 1.000 0.264
Table II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF REVEALED CHOICE DATA
Pooled Head Middle Tail
FriendsOwn 0.022 (0.001)∗∗∗ 0.021 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.081 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.143 (0.006)∗∗∗
Base 0.391 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.017 (0.026) 0.418 (0.106)∗∗∗ 5.943 (0.338)∗∗∗
Social 0.391 (0.021)∗∗∗ −0.123 (0.072) −0.082 (0.076) 0.036 (0.067)
DevOwn 0.062 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.055 (0.004)∗∗∗ 0.150 (0.005)∗∗∗ 0.205 (0.005)∗∗∗
Base x Social −0.221 (0.015)∗∗∗ 0.053 (0.026)∗ 0.001 (0.150) −1.299 (0.593)∗
FriendsOwn x Social −0.004 (0.001)∗∗∗ −0.004 (0.002)∗ 0.002 (0.003) 0.005 (0.007)
Free −0.020 (0.035) 0.058 (0.055) 0.059 (0.049) −0.129 (0.080)
AIC 165719.452 25940.020 50976.990 55254.795
LR Test 7964(7)p = 0 962.2(7)p = 0 1380(7)p = 0 1865(7)p = 0
Num. events 11403 3018 4402 3983
Num. obs. 590936 26522 120988 443126
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table III
RESULTS OF ESTIMATION FOR SPLIT SAMPLE ANALYSIS
by network externalities, social influence, or brand
loyalty as much as games in the tail end of the
market. The games in the tail on the other hand
are heavily impacted by other channels such as
word of mouth between friends and brand loyalty
of existing customers.
For games in the head, we notice that these
games only benefit from network externalities
when the game had social features. Each point
increase in user base meant five percent increase
in odds of purchase for multiplayer games in this
group. No such effect was observed for single
player games in the head of the market. Yet the
effect of social features was reversed between the
head and tail. Meaning there may be a non-linear
relation between social features and user base. If
the network is not large enough, as is the case in
the tail, the social features actually hurt the game.
The reason for this reversal can be summed as: a
multiplayer game without players is not attractive.
The interaction between social influence and
social features, while statistically significant in
the head of the market, was economically in-
significant. The net effect was 0.4% hence quite
negligible.
V. LIMITATIONS
We used a conditional logit model that does
not take into account the time effects in this
study. The reason for this was due to the na-
ture of our dependent variable. The dependent
variable, ownership is binary in nature. Until a
person purchases a game, the variable is set to 0
and after purchase it becomes 1. The appropriate
model for this kind of relation is a time variant
survival model. Yet, survival models focus on a
single event (e.g. purchase of a single game). With
about 1975 distinct events, the survival model is
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not applicable. While there are risk models that
can accomodate a handful of distinct events, we
could not find a more appropriate model than a
conditional logit model for this study.
Second, the findings presented in this study
do not establish causality. Our model used in
this study does not account for endogeneity and
cyclical correlations between our dependent and
independent variables. Hence, we advise the read-
ers against causal reading of the relation between
network effects and ownership.
Finally, we would like to remind the readers
that brand loyalty in information goods context is
slightly different from the pyhsical goods context.
We encourage readers to keep this difference in
mind in their use of the results.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We set out to answer three research questions:
(1) understanding the effect of network effects on
purchasing behavior, (2) uncovering the role of
social features in moderating network effects, and
(3) evaluating these effects in different segments
of the market. Our findings reveal the network
effects and purchasing behavior are related and
that the effect of network effects varied between
market segments. We found significant differences
between the head and the tail of the long tail
market in terms of the effectiveness of network
effects. The demand at the head of the long tail
market was not as influenced by our variables of
interest as the tail of the market. This finding
suggests that the demand at the head of the market
is driven more by factors external to our study
such as advertising. It is typical for an AAA game
(typical games in the head) to have astronomical
advertising budgets. GTA V had a total budget of
$265 million, out of which $150 million was spent
for advertising [38].
We found that social influence and network
externalities was more effective towards the tail
of the market. Lacking the advertising budget of
super stars and big name developers, the niche
players rely more on user base and social in-
fluence to generate sales. These companies can
increase their sales through methods that increase
their network such as giveaways, free sampling,
discounts, and participating in bundles. They can
engage and mobilize their existing customers in
forums and social media to trigger word of mouth
effects. Similarly, we found that brand loyalty
was a significant driver in the tail of the market.
The smaller firms that operate in the tail of the
market, lacking the advertising capabilities, can
utilize their reputation and direct contacts with
their customers to increase their sales.
In answering our second research question re-
garding the role of social features, we uncovered
an interesting difference between the head and
the tail of the market. At the head of the market
we found that social features enhanced the effects
of network externalities. Meaning when a large
user base exists, the social features enhance these
effects. We observed opposite effects in the tail of
the market. Suggesting if the user base is small
social features can have a detrimental role. The
games that rely on social features to engage users
need a large enough user base to create engage-
ment. In everyday terms, a multiplayer game with-
out players is not very desirable for customers.
The literature argues intensity of network effects
can be enhanced through product features [15].
Our results reveal a boundary condition in this re-
lationship, if the network size is insufficient these
features can harm, rather than enhance utility.
The findings of this study contributes to the
literature on social influence and network external-
ities. We found significant differences in how these
effects operated in the head and tail of the long tail
market. Our results reveal an important distinction
between the workings of the two effects, namely,
network externalities can be enhanced through
social features. Yet the effect of social influence
remains unchanged. Our findings of brand loyalty
in software markets, provide empirical evidence
for a relation long overlooked by IS research.
Future research can expand upon this finding by
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